The Somali Nation's Irregular WarfareSSgt Patrick Sipplin"Class Name Goes Here"March 24, 2014Western civilization, with our superior technology and organization, has long been killed by primitive or "savages"" whose style of warfare we misunderstood and whose skills surpassed those of the West in irregular warfare. Irregular warfare is the oldest form of warfare, and is a phenomenon that goes by many names, including tribal warfare, primitive warfare, “small wars,” and low-intensity conflict. The term irregular warfare seems best to describe the wide variety of these “small wars” in much of the non-Western world, and will increasingly attract the attention of the community 'intelligence. Since World War II, by one count, there have been more than 80 irregular conflicts, including civil wars in Rwanda and Somalia, guerrillas in Sudan and rebellions in Chechnya involving irregular elements fighting against other irregular forces regulars of a central government or an external intervention force. The acquisition and use of modern military technology is often seen as a solution to the problems of late 20th century warfare, of which information warfare is the most recent example. Irregular warfare, however, remains surprisingly unaffected by technological changes. In an irregular conflict, sociology, psychology, and history will have more to say about the nature of the conflict, including its persistence and intensity. One of the most visible activities of irregular warfare in Somalia has been development planning. Typically, we engage in parallel planning which involves simultaneous planning and coordination between planners from the strategic to the tactical level… middle of the paper… non-traditional mission indicators. Future operations may suggest alternatives. Addressing the issues raised here and responding to the uncertainties outlined in reference to irregular warfare procedures can provide a more subtle analysis of the capabilities of modern, irregular forces. What is needed is a greater degree of attention, sensitivity and flexibility towards irregular forms of warfare. It requires the Community to preserve the expertise it has in areas where irregular warfare is ongoing or likely, and to develop new expertise and the people to use them for this form of warfare. References Allard, Kenneth “Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned (April 2002) Arnold, S.L. and Stahl, David T., “A Power Projection Army in Operations Other Than War (Winter 1993-94) Taylor, John M. “Somalia: More than meets the eye,” Marine Corps Gazette (November 1993)