The extent of our moral duty regarding famine-fighting In the article "Famine, Wealth and Morality", Peter Singer argues that our conceptions of moral faith must change. Specifically, he argues that providing famine relief is not optional but a moral duty and not contributing money is immoral. As Singer says: “The way people in rich countries react…cannot be justified; indeed, the entire way we view moral issues – our moral conceptual scheme – must be changed, and with it, the way of life that has become taken for granted in our society” (135). In other words Singer believes that unless you can find something wrong with the following topic, you will have to drastically change your lifestyle and the way you spend your money. While some may believe his conclusion is too radical, Singer insists that it is the logical outcome of his argument. In summary, his view is that all wealthy people should give much more to famine relief. While I agree with Singer's argument in principle, I have a problem with his conclusion. In my opinion, the conclusion advocated by Singer is underdeveloped. For example, when Singer talks about the strong and the weak, the strong principle is this: "if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing something of comparable moral importance, we should morally do so" (136). Singer's point with this principle is that we are obligated to limit moral wrong, such as famine in this case, in any case not morally wrong to the point where by giving more we cause ourselves as much suffering as the amount of suffering we we breed. This principle, Singer thinks, is almost as incontrovertible as his assumption, which I would say I disagree with because, as I will show, it does not take into account the right to your