Original rights are rights of freedom that serve to protect citizens from oppression by the State. Which are weak rights surrounding civil political rights, which emerged from the American and French revolutions.2 From the 18th to the 19th century these are living instruments of positive law and not just idealistic ideas, perceived only as first generation rights. The Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776 contained the right to free elections, trial by jury, respect for property, and press opportunities, but excluded social rights identified with the state's welfare capacity. Likewise, the first twelve amendments to the United States Constitution guarantee only physical security and a functioning legal framework. The same thoughts prevailed in France where the Declaration des Droits de l'Homme eet du Citoyen of 1789 limited itself to establishing an operational structure of the administration that did not burden the State with powerful claims. In the same way civil liberties were cornered throughout the nineteenth century, simple rights became a vital component of advanced constitutions where they are absolutely bound to established liberties. Until the mid-20th century, various social and monetary rights were recognized on a sacred level, in particular by the Soviet Constitution of 1917 and the German Weimar Constitution. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the Irish Constitution of 1937 incorporated a provision on “standards of mandate for social approach”.3 Despite these varieties, first generation rights are important to the Constitution and have never been discarded. It provides an applied step to recognize different rights and recognize two particular limited classes. Socioeconomic rights are excluded but are rather defined as second generation rights. The historical growth of both rights has meant that rights have been addressed in an unexpected way. As Judge Albie argues, this structure will suggest that the second generation is less critical than the first. It has a tendency to outline a first concern