Although Algeria saw some uprisings in early 2011, the scale and outcome of these uprisings were not like those in Libya, Tunisia and Egypt. The fact that the regime did not change in Algeria during the 2011 Arab Spring has made many think that the Algerian civil war of 1992-2002 acted as a breath of fresh air for the Algerian state and immunized Algeria against Arab Spring. But Algeria had its spring more than two decades before the Arab Spring of 2011. Bruce Riedelar argues that even in 2011 the Algerian Spring preceded the Tunisian uprising. It is true that widespread and publicized protests erupted across Algeria in the first half of January 2011, but these were a continuation of protests that began in late 2010. These protests, however, calmed down as quickly as they had erupted due to various reasons which will be discussed shortly. There is no doubt that the decade-long civil war, as well as the price paid by ordinary Algerians for it (killing by Islamists or the army), meant that many Algerians perceived that another uprising could bring more people back. the same. But this argument alone is not sufficient to explain why and how the Algerian regime has managed to counter and contain the revolutionary fervor from the beginning of 2011 to today. Several issues such as the role of the international community, oil, and the regime's past experience with Islamic parties, as well as multiparty politics, have played a crucial role in allowing the regime to maintain its power. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on "Why Violent Video Games Shouldn't Be Banned"? Get an original essay The Algerian "Arab Spring" occurred on October 4, 1988 in the suburbs of the capital Algiers. Around 20,000 ordinary Algerian citizens took to the streets and protested against the terrible socioeconomic conditions. In response to the week-long protests, President Chadli Bendjadid vowed to end one-party rule and amend the constitution with a referendum to open political space for a multi-party system. Together with other parties, the FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) was born in 1989, which later dominated the political scene. Since the main cause of the uprising was a bad economy, the FIS placed economic reforms at the center of its main agenda. Before the uprisings, the Algerian government used regulations to keep many petty bourgeoisie out of the Algerian economy. The FIS, on the other hand, supported fewer regulations, making it easier for small businesses to enter the market, eliminating quotas and trade barriers, promoting small and medium-sized businesses, reducing taxes, and ending state monopolies. The FIS's promises were attractive to the middle class and the poor because the party argued that its policies would create jobs, end corruption and improve the economy. More than two decades later, when Algerians took to the streets in early 2011, they had the same demands. The only difference was that this time there was no FIS, or any other large independent political party opposing the ruling elite. In contrast, the opposition was highly fragmented, which meant that not only was there no leading party to organize the protests; there were opposing opinions on the revolt and the claims. Algeria has a relatively free press and when these riots broke out, the private, government-sponsored national press began to remind Algerians of the Algerian Spring of 1988 and that if things change in Algeria, it will not be for the better. The free press is often linked to thepromotion of democracy and people's voice. But in Algeria, he did exactly the opposite, calling for peace and security over democracy in 2011. The role of social media is highlighted time and again in the success of Egypt and other North African countries, but the Algerian case demonstrates that social average cannot be decisive. determining factor in bringing about a revolution. Algerian Internet is also relatively freer than other North African states because in Algeria there are private Internet service providers that connect directly to Europe without any government control. The internet and social media were accessible in Algeria during the Arab Spring but, as we have seen, the regime in Algeria has not changed. So, although we cannot ignore the role that social media has played in Egypt, it should be clear that social media is not an important factor in system change or the success of a revolution, but one of the means that can be used to advertising by those who are well trained or accustomed to using it effectively. Algeria's large military and police forces were also one of the key issues that helped the regime contain the spring of 2011. The number of security forces and police increased as a direct result of the 1988 uprisings. During the civil war , the regime continued to increase spending on both military equipment and the size of the police. In 2011, the police and gendarmerie had 200,000 members. The regime managed to send a large number of security forces to the protest areas. For example, in some riots that occurred in early 2011, especially in large cities such as the capital Algiers, the police outnumbered the protesters by a ratio of 10 to 1. The other problem that allowed the police to contain the revolution it was the way the security forces handled the situation. the situation. During the October 1988 riots, security forces killed 500 people in two days. In 2011, however, only three protesters were killed in a week of protests. The regime knew that the blood of the killed protesters could act as a catalyst and would be used as a symbol to draw more people to the streets. This is why the regime was very careful to avoid mass killings and used police forces to block access to protest sites or used the army to disperse protesters by arresting them or directing them to different routes. When the Algerian army canceled the 1991 elections, it also arrested the leaders of the FIS party and banned the party in 1992. When the military saw that Bendjadid was sympathetic to the FIS, they staged a coup and removed him from power in 1992. The Western powers also gave legitimacy to the FIS because it came to power democratically. For example, the Clinton administration, which feared that abandoning the FIS would turn Algeria into another Iran, entered into preemptive negotiations with the FIS in the early 1990s. When the military noticed that the West sympathized with the FIS, the junta did various things to provoke violent reactions from the FIS in order to turn the Western powers and the Algerian people against the party in the 1990s. For example, on January 27, 1992, Rabih Kebir, FIS spokesperson for foreign affairs, called for a dialogue between the government and the FIS. The military arrested him the next day. In 2011, to avoid the mistakes of the past, immediately after the outbreak of the riots, the regime ended the emergency government and effectively encouraged the creation of more political parties. Such a policy was welcomed by some elites not because they could raise their voices, but rather because that was ita way for some elites to enter into a patron-client relationship with the regime and enjoy some of the oil spoils. Furthermore, this led to the fragmentation of the opposition as several parties were created and each of these presented its own agenda. The military's focus on the economy has forced army leaders to be more pragmatic in dealing with protesters and avoiding an economic shutdown. . The army has control over Sonatrach, Algeria's largest national oil company. Due to the ups and downs of oil prices, Algerians have learned to base their national budget on a discounted oil price. This means that if the price of oil is, for example, $40 per barrel, the Algerian state bases its budget as if the price of oil were $10 per barrel. This had two effects: it allowed the Algerian ruling class to protect itself from the United States' manipulation of oil prices and, on the other hand, it created a massive monetary reserve that comes in handy in times of crisis. The Algerian regime learned this lesson the hard way. Oil revenues constituted a major source of state income (57.9%) and Algeria had an average GDP growth rate of 6.8% until 1986. The American government pushed Saudi Arabia to increase its production, resulting in a drop in prices. of oil from $40 a barrel to $10 in 1986. These changes meant that Algerian revenues were reduced by 55% (from $47 billion in 1985 to $21 billion in 1986). Faced with a liquidity shortage and reluctant to involve the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the Algerian economy, President Chadli Bendjadid (1979–1992) cut imports to the point that, in a very short time, most basic products , like wheat, were scarce or very expensive in the late 1980s. This decline in national income, which increased the price of food, was one of the main causes of the first Algerian spring in 1988. By basing its national budget on a discounted price of oil, the Algerian regime in 2011 was able to use the enormous monetary reserve in order to lower the price of basic necessities such as flour and sugar and also to increase the salaries of public employees by 34%. Faced with large sums of money, the government has tried to buy out young people and get them off the streets through low-cost loans. For example, after the January 2011 riots, the government provided a loan of up to $300,000 for young people who wanted to open a business. Instead of taking to the streets, young people flooded the offices involved in applying for and processing such loans. So, while oil was a curse for the past regime, it was instrumental in saving the regime from the wave of revolutionary fervor in 2011. The military's role in protecting its interests in Algeria is undoubtedly important, but what makes it different from the Egyptian military one is its penetration into opposition parties. For example, during the civil war, the Algerian Secret Service (DRS) created more radical militant Islamic groups such as the GIA (Islamic Armed Group) to give the FIS a bad name. Even today the army has influence and has its elements in the opposition parties. The army's influence on parties has helped the military both divide the opposition and use these elements to control the parties. Furthermore, Egypt's military also had fewer economic ties to Mubarak than Algeria's. As Haseeb reminds us of a saying from Arab countries: “If every state has an army, the Algerian army has a state.” The civil war ended in 2002thanks to President Abdulaziz Bouteflika's reconciliation program. Although Islamic rebels are still active in Algeria, they no longer pose a major threat. The reconciliation process brought relative stability to the Algerian state throughout the 2000s. Although U.S.-Algeria relations date back to 1795, in the post-9/11 era, the U.S. and Algerian governments signed various agreements that focus on weakening domestic and international terrorist cells. Since 2005, for example, Algeria and the United States have signed the Joint Military Dialogue, a process that includes military exchanges, training, and both countries have conducted joint military exercises. The United States is also Algeria's largest trading partner for crude oil. Furthermore, Bouteflika initiated a second wave of reconciliation by launching a referendum called the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation. The referendum approved in September 2005 aims to grant amnesty to Muslims who have not committed "murders, rapes or attacks". In 2007, the regime also began providing regular salaries to “patriots” for their work during the civil war, in order to buy their support. Unlike Egypt which banned all opposition parties, the regime in Algeria has managed to fragment the opposition and bring some key opposition figures under its payroll. Some of these Islamic parties such as the Algerian Green Alliance created a coalition government sharing the oil spoils after the 2012 elections. The coming to power of Islamic parties in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, on the one hand, made the Algerians municipalities distrustful of Islamic parties while, on the other hand, allowed the regime to strengthen its grip on power. After the Arab Spring, Islamic parties such as An-Nahda in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt came to power. The West supported or sanctioned the Algerian regime's action aimed at repressing what was growing in North Africa, Islamic extremism. Some terrorist cells and groups such as AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib) operated in Algeria long before the Arab Spring. The support of the United States and European countries for the Algerian army was quite strong, even if the army's actions resulted in the loss of lives of American or British citizens. For example, when several US and British citizens were killed by the Algerian army during the January 2013 hostage crisis, William Hague, the British Foreign Secretary, argued that we (the West) cannot make a “judgment” on the actions of the Algerian army. . The hostage crisis of early 2013 was prompted by French involvement in protecting the Malian government from Islamic extremists. Although this is a recent issue, we have seen elsewhere in the essay that the army was active in buying Western support after 1992. The utilitarian role of the Algerian army in the “war on terrorism”, especially once The West's loss of Mubarak, a long-time ally in Egypt, means that the West has come to see Algeria as the only reliable ally with strong military prowess in North Africa. So, since the actions of the Algerian army are largely sanctioned by the international community, the army has a free hand to do what it wants to protect its interests in the country. Algerians had already experienced that the army would use any force to limit the power of parties based on Islamic ideology in the 1990s because the Algerian state claims to be a secular state. The military is not the only entity that.